

ViEWS monthly forecasts, July 2018

Summary of forecasts *

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This report presents ViEWS forecasts for July 2018 through July 2021 as of 30 June 2018. The forecasts are based on data that are updated up to and including May 2018. The underlying data were produced by the UCDP (<http://ucdp.uu.se>). The ViEWS compilation of these data and other sources and available at <https://www.pcr.uu.se/research/views/data/downloads/>.

In this report, we highlight the most recent developments. For a discussion of what underlies the forecasts in terms of slowly changing risk factors as well as methodological issues, see the ViEWS overview article¹. Figure 1 shows our country-level forecasts for July 2018, Figure 2 the corresponding forecasts at detailed geographic locations, and Figure 3 indicates forecasted trends in organized violence up to July 2021. Figure 4 shows the most recent observed conflict events. Similar reports for previous months are available at <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/views/>, along with other information on the ViEWS project.

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¹<http://files.webb.uu.se/uploader/1576/ViEWS-OverviewArticle-June2018.pdf>.

1 Forecasts for July 2018




Figure 1: Ensemble forecasts for July, 2018

The plots in Figure 1 show the ViEWS country-level forecasts for the immediate future – what do we forecast will happen in July 2018? We show the probability of at least one event in each country in July 2018, based on data up to and including May 2018. Countries with red color have forecast probabilities close to 1, whereas blue countries have forecasts at less than 0.01. When the forecasts indicate that no events is as likely as at least one event, countries are drawn with an orange color.

Our forecasts for July 2018 to July 2021 have not changed discernibly from last month’s forecasts. The July 2018 run is using the same set of models as last month, and the UCDP has not observed conflict events in May 2018 that clearly change the forecasts.

We forecast a high probability of conflict in countries that have a recent history of conflict or with recent protest events. In Mali, Nigeria, and DR Congo at least one conflict event is almost certain. We also forecast a high probability of state-based conflict (**sb**) in Cameroon, driven by recent events (see Figure 4a). Tensions and violence between anglophones and francophones observed since 2016 have escalated after separatists symbolically declared the independence of ‘Ambazonia’ in October 2017. The separatist violence, involving several groups, continued throughout the spring in 2018. There have also been clashes between government forces and IS (often referred to as Boko Haram) in the northern part of the country.² In Kenya, clashes between the government and Al-Shabaab have been reported in every month up to April 2018, and these are likely to continue.³


The forecast maps for non-state conflict (**ns**) and one-sided violence (**os**) follow partly the same patterns as **sb**, but the patterns of past events differ across conflict types (see

²See Figure 4a and <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/12422>.

³See Figure 4a and <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/10589>.

Figure 4). Cameroon and Egypt, for instance, have not had much **ns** conflict, whereas Libya and Sudan have seen a lot. We forecast a high probability also of **ns** in Kenya due to recent confrontations between cattle rustlers and herders. Furthermore, actors with unclear affiliation carried out attacks against civilians.

The forecasts for **os** respond to about the same factors, but are less clearly related to protests and regime change. They also in general occur more frequently in newly independent countries. Kenya, again, will see continued one-sided violence, most likely perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab and the government of Kenya.⁴



(a) State-based conflict (sb), (b) Non-state conflict (ns), July, 2018, (c) One-sided violence (os), July, 2018

Figure 2: Ensemble forecasts for July, 2018

Figure 2 presents forecasts at fine-grained sub-national geographical locations for July 2018, for each of the three outcomes. The color mapping is the same as for the *cm* forecasts.

The densest risk clusters for state-based conflict are in north-eastern Nigeria, the North and South Kivu provinces in DRC, in Somalia, and in Darfur. The forecasted violence in Mali is also quite intense, but somewhat more spread out geographically. All of these regions have been ravaged with violence for years as shown in Figure 4. These maps reflect that countries' recent conflict history is the strongest predictor of future violence.

The data from the UCDP also indicate some shifts within countries. Fulani violence against other groups have escalated in both Nigeria and in Mali. The Egyptian Armed Forces initiated a 'Comprehensive Operation – Sinai 2018' in February, with significantly increased state-based conflict activity.

The forecasts for non-state conflict and one-sided violence depend on the same factors although with somewhat different implications. For **ns**, we forecast main clusters in central Nigeria, Central African Republic, North and South Kivu, Darfur and the Kenyan Rift Valley. For **os**, northern Nigeria, Darfur, North Kivu, and Burundi are the primary hotspots.

⁴See Figure 4c and <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/onesided/1071>.

2 Forecasts July 2018 to July 2021


All forecasts shown so far have been for July 2018, the second month after the most recent data available. Figure 3 indicates how the forecasts change up to July 2021. The color mapping is roughly the same as above, but here correspond to the forecasted proportion of PRIO-GRID cells in **sb** conflict for each country. In Burundi, for instance, we expect about 18% of the cells to have conflict in each month. In Ethiopia, the forecast is 1.2%.

We forecast an increasing probability of state-based violence in Nigeria, Rwanda, and Uganda. We also forecast an increase in non-state and one-sided violence in Rwanda,


3 History of UCDP organized violence

Figure 4 presents the the recent history of violence in each PRIO-GRID cell. Red cells had conflict in July 2018, and purple ones have not seen conflict in many years.


Figures 4a, 4b, 4c show state-based, non-state, and one-sided violence respectively from the UCDP. Figure 4d shows data on protests from ACLED (<https://www.acleddata.com>).



(a) State-based conflict (sb), July, 2018




(b) Non-state conflict (ns), July, 2018




(c) One-sided violence (os), July, 2018


Figure 3: Heatmaps for July, 2018




(a) State-based conflict (sb), June, 2018



(b) Non-state conflict (ns), June, 2018



(c) One-sided violence (os), June, 2018



(d) Protests (pr), June, 2018

Figure 4: Decay function maps of observed conflict for June, 2018